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  Sexual harassment has become an increasingly important issue in Oregon and across America over the past twenty
years.  Before 1975, sexual harassment [FN1] did not even exist as a legal concept. [FN2]  An injured individual
was relegated to alleging a traditional common law tort against the tortfeaser. [FN3]  Today, courts have expanded
the laws providing a cause of action for sexual harassment in ways unimaginable twenty to thirty years ago. [FN4]
  *722 While sexual harassment has implications outside of the workplace,  [FN5] the primary focus of sexual
harassment litigation remains in the work environment.  In the work environment context, it is hard to imagine
opposition to aggressively combating any form of sexual harassment.  For example, many cases involving sexual
harassment involve offensive physical touching, [FN6] or threats to fire or not promote an employee if she does not
consent to her supervisor's advances. [FN7]  An employer is required to take prompt action to remedy or prevent
such occurrences. [FN8]  Where the employer fails to take remedial action, allowing an injured plaintiff to recover
for her injuries is certainly appropriate.
  The goals of eliminating prejudice and biases in our society are, in general, furthered by sexual harassment laws.
As such, the constitutionality of sexual harassment laws are rarely questioned.  However, the issue that may be, but
is rarely, raised, is the extent to which aggressive stances on all forms of sexual harassment in the workplace
infringe on an employer's and employee's respective freedom of expression rights, whether under the United States
Constitution's First Amendment [FN9] or analogous provisions in state constitutions.  The Oregon Constitution, for
example, expresses its own important goals of personal freedoms, including the right to "free expression of opinion .
. . [and] the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever." [FN10]
  *723 Possible conflicts exist between constitutional rights of free expression and statutory rights to a workplace
free of sexual harassment. Sexual harassment laws require that an employer take preventive action to ensure a
workplace free of abusive or offensive conduct.  In the case of harassing conduct based on speech, broad
proscriptions on offensive language and expressive conduct may encompass workplace speech that may be protected
by the speaker's right of expression. [FN11]  Employers are given little guidance as to where to draw the line
between harassing speech and protected speech.  In general, such a determination is based on whether specific
conduct rises to the level of "severe or pervasive" as to alter the workingconditions of the employee. [FN12]  This
amorphous concept may tend to create situations where employers do not know where the statutory line is to be
drawn between permitted and prohibited expression.  In such cases, employers will typically err on the side of
caution and broad proscriptions on remarks, images, and conduct may result. [FN13]
  This Comment will address how federal and state sexual harassment laws operate in light of the freedoms of
expression embodied within the Oregon Constitution.  First, the Comment examines the relevant federal and state
sexual harassment laws that provide the backdrop for potential conflict with Oregon free expression interests.
Second, the Comment addresses what rights regarding speech and conduct the laws prohibiting hostile environment
sexual harassment implicate.  Third, the Comment details how the sexual harassment laws in Oregon may violate
Oregon constitutional mandates.  Finally, the Comment identifies *724 how future free expression challenges to the
sexual harassment laws might be resolved.
I Background Law
A. Federal Sexual Harassment Law
  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") is the primary tool for most employees seeking redress for
sexual harassment in the workplace. [FN14]  Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against a person
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. [FN15] Prohibited discrimination may include termination,
refusal to hire, or any other practice which alters a person's "compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of
employment." [FN16]  Courts have recognized that the prohibition of discrimination in "conditions or terms" of
employment requires a workplace free from all forms of harassment. [FN17]
  Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to implement the provisions of Title
VII. [FN18]  In this capacity, the EEOC developed guidelines defining the conduct that constitutes sexual
harassment under Title VII. [FN19]  Courts *725 dealing with sexual harassment cases have been influenced by the
EEOC's guidelines, but these regulations are not binding on courts. [FN20]  Nevertheless, courts give deference to
the guidelines because they "constitute a body of experience and informed judgment" that can be useful in deciding
sexual harassment cases. [FN21]
  In general, and in accord with the EEOC's guidelines, courts have held that workplace conduct violates Title VII if
it is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the employee's] employment and create an abusive
working environment"' because of the worker's sex, race, religion, or national origin. [FN22]  Infrequent or isolated
insults generally do not create an abusive or hostile work environment, but the abuse need not be so severe as to
drive the employee from her job. [FN23]
  Specifically, sexual harassment arises when the employee's submission to unwelcome sexual advances is made a
term or condition of employment, [FN24] when the employee's submission, or the lack of it, is the basis of
employment decisions affecting the employee, [FN25] or when harassment by a supervisor, co-worker, or customer
[FN26] creates a hostile environment. [FN27]
  *726 Where the theory of recovery for sexual harassment rests on the denial by a supervisor of a tangible
(economic) job benefit, such as promotion, to a subordinate employee due to the employee's rejection of sexual
advances, the courts characterize the harassment as "quid pro quo."  Where the action of a supervisor does not result
in loss of a tangible benefit, but still has the effect of altering the employee's work environment, courts characterize
the harassment as "hostile environment."
  Expression is at the heart of both forms of harassment, since the demands for sexual favors involved in quid pro
quo harassment, as well as conduct that creates a hostile environment, generally take the form of expression.
However, tension between free speech interests and sexual harassment only arises from the hostile environment
branch of harassment. [FN28]
  The categorization of sexual harassment as either quid pro quo or hostile environment has provided the courts a
workable framework to address the liability of employers under such claims. [FN29]  Courts created both of these
theories before the EEOC issued its guidelines, and even though the guidelines did not use *727 the terms or the
distinction, courts continue to rely on them. [FN30]  Nevertheless, despite this analytical framework, how broadly
"sexual harassment" is to be defined is by no means a settled issue and courts, including the Supreme Court,
continue to further define the conduct which is actionable under Title VII. [FN31]
  In light of the expansive and yet-undetermined coverage of Title VII, employers have been quick to institute broad
anti-harassment policies in order to avoid future lawsuits.  In Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, [FN32] the Court
made it clear that an employer's failure to institute written policies regarding sexual harassment may very well
preclude the employer from asserting a viable defense to a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment. [FN33]
  In Burlington, the Court described the test for employer liability under a claim of sexual harassment as follows:
    An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment
created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee.  When no tangible
employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject
to proof by a preponderance of the evidence . . . .  The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by
the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. . . .  No affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor's
harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.
[FN34]
  The incentive for employers to institute sexual harassment policies after Burlington is obvious-failure to provide
"preventative or corrective opportunities" to employees is an invitation for courts to rule for future plaintiffs on
summary judgment.  On the other hand, proof that an employee unreasonably failed to use established complaint
procedures will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the affirmative *728
defense. [FN35]  Thus, simply from a business perspective, it is beneficial for an employer to set out a policy on
sexual harassment.  Additionally, several courts have granted summary judgment to employers as a result of their
prompt remedial action, despite the existence of a hostile environment. [FN36]
  In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, [FN37] the companion case to Burlington, the Supreme Court had occasion to
apply the current test for hostile environment.  In Faragher, a female lifeguard sued her employer (the City) claiming
that her two immediate supervisors had created a "sexually hostile atmosphere" at work by repeatedly subjecting her
and other female lifeguards to "'uninvited and offensive touching,' by making lewd remarks, and by speaking of
women in offensive terms." [FN38]  The Supreme Court held that in a situation such as Faragher's, an employer is
vicariously liable for actionable discrimination caused by a supervisor, subject to an affirmative defense looking to
the reasonableness of the employer's conduct as well as that of the plaintiff. [FN39]  Because Faragher did not suffer
from any tangible employment action, the City would generally be entitled to raise its affirmative defenses to
liability.  The City did have a sexual harassment policy in place.  However, in this case, the Court found that the
defense was unavailable to the City as a result of its failure to disseminate its sexual harassment policy or to monitor
the activities of its supervisors. [FN40] The Court held that given these failures, the City could not, as a matter of
law, demonstrate the first prong of the affirmative defense: reasonable care in preventing the harassment. [FN41]
Consequently, the Court found the City vicariously liable. [FN42]
  *729 Federal sexual harassment law has thus far developed with little attention to First Amendment concerns.
Despite the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Faragher and Burlington, the central question in any hostile
environment sexual harassment case remains whether the harassment has risen to the level of creating an abusive or
hostile environment.  By its nature, this standard is imprecise and allows for latitude in application.
  For example, different courts have held similar types of expression to amount to, or not to amount to, a hostile
environment.  In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., [FN43] the court held that pornography posted at the
workplace contributed to a hostile work environment. [FN44]  However, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that
workplace pornography may have only a "de minimis effect" on the work environment. [FN45]  Similarly, courts
have held similar types of speech to contribute, and not to contribute, to a hostile work environment. [FN46]  While
many of these differences can be explained by the fact that hostile work environment claims are, by their nature, fact
intensive inquiries, the mere existence of imprecise standards requires employers to make delicate policy judgments
in advance.  The employer is asked to determine whether or not specific misconduct may rise to the level of "severe
or pervasive" as to alter the working conditions of an employee.  This determination must be made before the
misconduct has occurred and before the ramifications of the act can be determined.  How are employers to make
such a judgment in advance?  The answer is that they cannot, and the rational employer wishing to avoid liability
will therefore prohibit potentially protected speech and conduct. [FN47]
*730 B. Oregon Sexual Harassment Law
  Oregon has enacted analogous statutory [FN48] and regulatory  [FN49] schemes to that of Title VII and the EEOC
regulations.  Oregon courts have recognized the general principles that were the basis of the Faragher and
Burlington decisions along with the two methodologies used in analyzing sexual harassment cases.  In Mains v. II
Morrow, Inc., [FN50] the Oregon Court of Appeals stated:
    In "quid pro quo" cases, the employer is liable if it links employment benefits to the acceptance or rejection of
sexual favors.  The employer is strictly liable if the supervisor uses the employee's acceptance or rejection of sexual
favors as a quid pro quo for job benefits . . . . "[In sexually 'hostile environment' cases,] [f]or sexual harassment to be
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive enough 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment
and create an abusive working environment."' [FN51]
  In general, Oregon courts have followed federal Title VII precedent ,  [FN52] but, until recently, Oregon courts
have had relatively little opportunity to consider the established Title VII framework. [FN53]  In the recent decisions
of Harris v. Pameco Corp. [FN54] and *731 Cantua v. Creager [FN55] the Oregon Court of Appeals had occasion to
address new questions presented under Oregon's sexual harassment laws.  In Harris, the court considered for the first
time the issue of whether same-sex sexual harassment is prohibited by ORS 659.030. [FN56]  The Supreme Court
had ruled on same question under Title VII in the 1998 case of Onacale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.
[FN57]  The court in Harris, in finding the Supreme Court's ruling "instructive" in interpreting ORS 659.030, came
to the same conclusion as the Court in Onacale, holding that "[t]here is nothing in the language of ORS
659.030(1)(b) that bars a claim of discrimination because the sexual harassment is aimed at a person of the same
gender." [FN58]
  Similarly, in Cantua, [FN59] the Oregon Court of Appeals addressed for the first time whether a plaintiff can make
out a sexual harassment hostile work environment claim based solely on having viewed incidents involving other
women.  Citing relevant Supreme Court precedent, the court "decline[d] to hold that plaintiff's claim had no basis in
fact and was not reasonable simply because she based her hostile-work-environment action on having observed
incidents of harassment involving other women." [FN60]
  Just as the Supreme Court continues to define the boundaries of hostile environment sexual harassment laws, so too
do the Oregon appellate courts. Thus, for the same reasons that Title VII compels analysis of its application in light
of free speech interests, so too does Oregon's analogous statute and case law.
C. Freedom of Expression under the Oregon Constitution
  Article I, section 8 of the Oregon Constitution forbids lawmakers from "restraining the free expression of opinion,
or *732 restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever." [FN61]  The prohibition on
such restrictions is meant to "foreclose[ ] the enactment of any law written in terms directed to the substance of any
'opinion' or any 'subject' of communication." [FN62]
  In State v. Robertson, [FN63] the Oregon Supreme Court established Oregon's basic framework for determining
whether a law unconstitutionally regulates protected expression or communication. [FN64]  First, the Robertson
court [FN65] recognized a distinction between laws that focus on the content of speech or writing and laws that
focus on proscribing the pursuit or accomplishment of forbidden results. [FN66]  A law of the former type is per se
invalid, with limited exceptions, as an unconstitutional restriction on freedom of expression. [FN67]  Such a law
regulates "speech per se" and does not limit liability under the statute to speech that has the effect of causing a
proscribed harm.  For example, a statute prohibiting making lewd and offensive remarks in the workplace would be
classified as one restricting speech per se because it is directed at particular words, not harms.  Such a law would
violate Article I, section 8, unless the restraint on speech fell within "some historical exception" that the
constitutional guarantee was not intended to reach.
  Where the law possibly implicates speech as an element of the offense, the courts must determine whether a
historical exception exists that justifies prohibiting speech.  Such an inquiry looks to whether an exception to the
free speech guarantees was "well established when the first American guarantees of freedom of expression were
adopted and that the guarantees then or in 1859 demonstrably were not intended to reach." [FN68]  Under the
"historical exception" analysis, a law that is directed to the substance of any opinion or subject of communication is
unconstitutional unless the law existed at the time of the First Amendment (1791) and at the time of the Oregon
Constitution (1859), and was not *733 eliminated by either.  Examples of such laws include: "perjury, solicitation or
verbal assistance in crime, some forms of theft, forgery and fraud and their contemporary variants." [FN69]  If the
law regulates speech per se and does not fit into a historical exception, the law is unconstitutional. [FN70]
  Second, where laws do not focus on speech per se, but instead focus on proscribing the pursuit or accomplishment
of a forbidden result, Robertson recognizes that such laws can be further divided into two categories. [FN71]  The
first category focuses on forbidden effects, but expressly prohibits expression used to achieve those effects. [FN72]
The second kind of law also focuses on forbidden effects, but does not refer to expression at all. [FN73]
  The law challenged in Robertson was of the former type. [FN74]  In Robertson, the defendant challenged a
coercion statute which made it a crime to "compel or induce another person to engage in conduct from which he has
the legal right to abstain by causing him to fear the disclosure of discreditable assertions about some person."
[FN75]  In striking down the statute, the court stated that a law prohibiting speech-caused harm is constitutional
unless incurably overbroad. [FN76]  A law is overbroad it if potentially restricts speech or conduct protected by free
expression guarantees, thereby effectively banning privileged speech along with unprivileged speech. [FN77]  In
such cases, the courts will attempt to construe *734 the statute narrowly to bring the scope of its restrictions within
constitutional boundaries.  If the law cannot be sufficiently narrowed, it violates Article I, section 8 because it
delegates legislative powers to the judge and jury in violation of ex post facto laws and invites the "standardless and
unequal application" of the law. [FN78]  In Robertson, the coercion statute held to be overbroad could not be saved
simply by a narrow construction of the statute's prohibition on speech. [FN79]
  An example of a "speech-caused-harm" statute in the context of workplace sexual harassment would be a statute
prohibiting the creation of a sexually hostile work environment by making lewd and offensive remarks.  Such a
statute would be a speech-caused harm statute because the legislature is prohibiting the harm instead of the words
themselves.  Arguably, the statute could be considered overbroad if, in restricting the harm, it also prohibits
expression of particular viewpoints, such as mere hostility to a particular sex. [FN80]
  A third kind of law that has the potential of limiting freedoms of expression, those referred to as "harm per se"
statutes, are laws which forbid specific effects without referring to expression at all. [FN81]  For example, a law that
makes it unlawful to create a sexually hostile work environment would be directed at specific effects of defendant's
actions-- sexual harassment--without addressing the form of the harassment, speech or otherwise. [FN82]  These
laws will generally be upheld unless the defendant can successfully assert that, apart from a vagueness claim, "the
statute could not constitutionally be applied to his particular words or other expression . . . ." [FN83]  The courts will
not recognize an argument that such a statute is per se invalid under Article I, section 8 "without the support of
legislative or other background showing that suppression of expression itself was the intended or expected object of
the law." [FN84]
*735 II Speech as Harassment
A. Identifying Speech That Creates a Hostile Environment
  The courts have set out no general rule as to what words or what kinds of speech can create a hostile environment.
[FN85]  In general, the activities supporting a claim for sexual harassment fall on a continuum "somewhere between
forcible rape and the mere utterance of an epithet." [FN86]  A law prohibiting quid pro quo sexual harassment
punishes speech, but no one would deny that such statutory restrictions are permissible.  Such a restriction is not
based on the speaker's message per se, but rather on the underlying coercive conduct.  As such, prohibiting such
conduct does not raise significant freedom of expression concerns.  However, much of the speech involved in hostile
environment cases may consist of sexually explicit comments, [FN87] sexual propositions, [FN88] vulgar personal
insults, [FN89] pornography in the workplace, [FN90] and demeaning references such as "honey," "dear," "baby,"
and "momma." [FN91]  These types of speech are regulated under the sexual harassment laws even if no
corresponding coercive conduct *736 or physical invasion occurs. [FN92]
  In sexual harassment cases, the courts have not recognized a categorically protected form of speech, politically
oriented or otherwise, which is alleged to be the basis for creating a hostile environment. [FN93]  The only
recognized limitation on liability is the requirement that the employee establishes the conduct complained of was
sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to alter her working conditions. [FN94]  For example, in Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, [FN95] Faragher was subjected to lewd and offensive remarks, which she argued created a hostile
environment. [FN96]  The Court, in upholding the district court's finding that Faragher's work environment was
sufficiently hostile, noted that Title VII does not *737 prohibit "genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men
and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite sex." [FN97]  Furthermore, mere
teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents will not amount to discriminatory changes in conditions of
employment. [FN98]  The Supreme Court continued: "Properly applied, [standards for judging hostility under Title
VII] will filter out complaints attacking 'the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of
abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing."' [FN99]
  Thus, both Title VII and ORS 659.030 define what speech will constitute sexual harassment by looking to the
resulting repercussions of the speech, rather than categorizing the content of the speech itself. [FN100]  The
Faragher Court stated that sporadic abusive language and the like would generally not rise to the level of "severe or
pervasive," but such a result is not because sporadic abusive language receives some protection different than that of
lewd and offensive remarks. [FN101]  Rather, it is simply assumed that such remarks will not constitute "severe or
pervasive" harassment as to offend the reasonable victim. [FN102]  In the language of *738 Oregon's constitutional
jurisprudence, Title VII and ORS 659.030 appear to fall within the category of "speech-caused harm" statutes.
[FN103]  The statutes are not violated by mere speech; the speech must create some type of harm.  And the courts
will only recognize "harm" when the speech is sufficiently severe and pervasive.
B. How Sexual Harassment Laws Suppress Protected Expression
  Courts have construed the language of Title VII to require affirmative steps be taken by the employer to prevent
employment discrimination. [FN104]  Title VII and ORS 659.030 are both written in broad, inclusive terms: The
task of identifying, punishing and remedying conduct labeled as "severe or pervasive" is left in the hands of the
employer.  If the employer fails in this obligation, it will be held, essentially, strictly liable for sexual harassment.
[FN105]
  As such, harassment laws have the potential to suppress speech by threatening employers with liability if they do
not punish employees who say offensive things in the workplace.  This indirect restriction on speech is just as
effective as a direct restriction would be.  Companies, fearing liability, implement policies prohibiting particular
conduct and speech and provide for disciplinary measures.  Employees, fearing discipline, avoid expressing the
proscribed speech.  The employees are as deterred by potential discipline as they would be by the threat of a lawsuit
directed at them. [FN106]
  The problem employers face when implementing such policies is determining when the conduct to be regulated or
prohibited is sufficiently "severe and pervasive."  As noted above, such a determination depends wholly on the
effect of the speech, not the *739 speech itself. [FN107]
  An employer could make the determination that allowing, for example, gender- related jokes in the workplace has
the potential of creating a hostile environment, and thus, potential liability on the employer's part. [FN108]
Implementing a policy restricting any gender-related jokes eliminates, or at least greatly reduces, the employer's
potential future liability.  The recent Burlington Industries v. Ellerth decision validates such a decision, stating that
having established preventative measures in place will buttress any defense to an employee's hostile environment
claim. [FN109]  Additionally, the harassment laws and the courts say nothing about categories of protected speech;
they only refer to conduct that has the potential for creating a hostile environment.  Thus, a prudent employer might
implement a gender-related jokes policy because the employer in such a situation has nothing to lose [FN110] and
everything to gain (i.e., increasingly limited liability). However, as Faragher recognized, gender-related jokes, in
general, will not rise to the level of "severe or pervasive" harassment. [FN111]  Thus, gender-related jokes, along
with other "potential" forms of harassment, may very well be protected expression that a prudent employer is
nevertheless encouraged to prohibit.
  The current state of sexual harassment law creates a potential tension between what the laws and the courts have
told employers to do to protect themselves from liability and a speaker's rights to "free expression of opinion . . . on
any subject whatever." [FN112]  So far, this tension is one-sided in favor of regulation because neither the sexual
harassment laws nor the courts have yet recognized constitutional limits on an employer's ability *740 to restrict
speech. [FN113]  Thus, at present, potential exposure to liability will prevail over employers' concerns for
employees' rights to express themselves, because employers derive no benefits from their employees' offensive
speech, but may bear liability for it.  Broad restrictions on sex- based speech and conduct are therefore encouraged.
  However, it seems possible to develop and apply principles for regulating sexually harassing workplace expression
that are faithful to both free speech and equality rights.  If the choice is ultimately to be left in the hands of the
employer, clearer lines must be established by the courts.  Absent such guidance, equality concerns will continue to
trump the important constitutional right of free speech.  However, this need not be the case. Valid restrictions on
harassing conduct do not need to be sacrificed to ensure that employers treat their employees with due respect.
III Implications
A. Jurisdictional Matters
  While Title VII has played a large part in Oregon's sexual harassment jurisprudence and ORS 659.030 is modeled
after the federal legislation, [FN114] as a jurisdictional matter, Article I, section 8 of the Oregon Constitution is not
implicated in federal litigation.  Courts have developed the well-established rule that it is the character of the
threatened action, and not of the defense, which will determine whether there is federal-question jurisdiction in the
federal courts. [FN115]  Where a "well plead complaint" implicates a federal law, such as Title VII, the federal
courts will have subject matter jurisdiction over that complaint. [FN116]  In such a case, the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution provides that if federal law conflicts with state law, federal law prevails. [FN117]
Additionally, the Supreme Court has explained that:
    *741 In the absence of explicit statutory language signaling an intent to pre-empt [state law], we infer such intent
where . . . the state law at issue conflicts with federal law, either because it is impossible to comply with both, or
because the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of congressional objectives.
[FN118]
  For example, in Garnett v. Renton School District, [FN119] students at a public school wished to form a religious
club, but the school district denied their request, citing its view that religious meetings on school grounds would
violate the Washington Constitution's establishment clause. [FN120]  The students argued that a federal law, the
Equal Access Act, [FN121] preempted the state constitutional mandate and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed. [FN122]  The court acknowledged that state constitutions can be more protective than the U.S. Constitution;
however, states cannot abridge rights granted by federal law. [FN123]  In the case of the Equal Access Act, any state
constitutional provisions limiting the scope of the federal law necessarily had to give way to the rights established in
the federal legislation.
  In Title VII cases, the statute could be challenged on First Amendment grounds under the U.S. Constitution,
[FN124] but any additional*742 protections provided by Article I, section 8 of the Oregon Constitution would not
provide a basis for challenge to Title VII's proscriptions.  As a result, while Title VII provides the general principles
that are the basis of ORS 659.030, an analysis of the sexual harassment law's ramifications on Oregon constitutional
liberties is limited to claims brought under Oregon law in Oregon courts.
B. State Action
  The second preliminary issue that must be addressed is the requirement of state action.  Article I, section 8
prohibits lawmakers from restraining free expression or restricting the rights of free speech. [FN125] Article I,
section 8 "is a prohibition on the legislative branch.  It prohibits the legislature from enacting laws restraining the
free expression of opinion or restricting the right to speak freely on any subject." [FN126] Absent a showing of state
action, there can be no violation of Article I, section 8. [FN127]
  An anti-harassment policy that a private employer creates on its own would raise no freedom of expression
difficulties. [FN128]  However, the fact that an employer has a right to do something to its employees does not mean
that the government may force the employer to do it.  For example, an employer may prohibit its employees from
burning flags on company time and on company property, but clearly the government cannot require employers to
do so. [FN129]
  When private employers restrict their employees' speech to comply with government mandates, including Title VII
and EEOC regulations, the employer is in effect acting as a government agent.  Government-instigated speech
restrictions are subject to First Amendment and Article I, section 8 constraints even in the private sector. [FN130]  It
is the federal or state law that is the *743 basis for liability and recovery.  As such, any civil liability must comport
with free expression standards. [FN131]
  Likewise, although litigation under ORS 659.030 is between two private parties, there is clearly state action in such
litigation.  Whether an employer's workplace policies are implemented because of a fear of future liability or
mandated by the court, the state action analysis remains the same.  The government simply cannot avoid Article I,
section 8 scrutiny by using the threat of legal liability to coerce a private party into implementing the speech
restrictions on its behalf.
C. Analysis of Sexual Harassment Laws under Robertson
  State v. Robertson [FN132] establishes the basic framework for determining whether a law violates Article I,
section 8 of the Oregon Constitution. [FN133]  Analysis under the Robertson framework focuses on the lawmaking
function insofar as it seeks to guide lawmakers in their decisions to enact laws affecting expression. With limited
exceptions, lawmakers must enact laws that, by their terms, focus on the harmful effects of expression, and not just
on the expression itself. [FN134]  Because the legislature's purpose behind the law is paramount in this analysis, that
purpose, as evidenced by the statute and rules themselves, must control the inquiry. [FN135]
  The statute in question, ORS 659.030, establishes an employer's liability for unlawfully discriminating against an
employee on the basis of sex with regard to terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. [FN136]  The relevant
Bureau of Labor & *744 Industry (BOLI) regulations further establish that, in regard to hostile environment sexual
harassment, the employer is liable if it knew or should have known of any conduct amounting to harassment.
[FN137]
1. Speech Per Se
  Having established that sexual harassment laws do indeed implicate speech ,  [FN138] determining the propriety of
ORS 659.030 and the BOLI regulations requires first examining whether Oregon's statute can be characterized as
legislation focusing on the content of speech, or the mere effects of such speech. [FN139]
  ORS 659.030 is written in broad terms.  To begin with, the statute's prohibition on "discrimination" is potentially
extremely far reaching.  As noted before, "discrimination," as interpreted by the courts, is intended to encompass all
conduct that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive" so as to create a hostile environment. [FN140]  Additionally, such
conduct is not limited to non-speech conduct.  Therefore, including "discrimination" in ORS 659.030 could arguably
be construed as a proscription on "speech per se."
  As Robertson identifies, not all laws that regulate "speech per se" are necessarily invalid. [FN141]  There may be a
recognized historical exception that allows valid governmental restraint. [FN142] However, in the context of ORS
659.030, a court would never be required to identify a historical exception to freedom of speech in the workplace for
a number of reasons.
  First, the potential defense that a certain kind of speech falls within a  "historical exception" presupposes that a
plaintiff has asserted a valid hostile environment harassment claim.  Ascertaining validity requires characterizing the
defendant's conduct *745 as sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment.
[FN143] In such an instance, the defendant-employer is faced with defending the claim by (1) asserting the conduct
complained of does not rise to the level of "severe or pervasive," or (2) claiming that the employer did indeed
exercise reasonable care to prevent and correct the harassing behavior and the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer. [FN144]  In either
case, the employer is not asserting a facial challenge to the statute itself.  The employer cannot reasonably assert, for
example, that the sexual harassment law's proscription on "discrimination" regulates speech per se (a determination
that would require the court to examine the aforementioned historical exceptions) because the plaintiff's claim is
based on specific discriminatory harm to her. [FN145]  It is the nature of the harm, not the underlying sexual
misconduct, that is the focus of ORS 659.030.  In comparison, the "speech per se" statutes are aimed at regulating
speech in the abstract, not the harm that may be caused by that speech, which itself may or may not be regulated by
another law.
  For example, in State v. Henry [FN146] the defendant challenged the constitutional validity of a statute that made
it a crime to disseminate obscene material or possess obscene material with the intent *746 to disseminate it.
[FN147]  The Oregon Supreme Court held that the obscenity statute violated Article I, section 8 and the statutory
restrictions could not be justified by a historical exception to its free speech provision. [FN148]  The statute
unconstitutionally regulated speech in the abstract by creating a "uniform vision on how human sexuality should be
regarded or portrayed," but, as the Henry court points out, invalidating the obscenity statute does not preclude
regulation of obscene materials in the interests of unwilling viewers, captive audiences and minors. [FN149]
  In the case of sexual harassment claims, an assertion that specific speech is protected under Article I, section 8
would require characterizing "discrimination" as abstract speech.  But the sexual harassment laws do not attempt to
proscribe merely abstract speech; the speech must have an effect on another individual and that effect must be
"severe or pervasive."  It is the effect of such speech that ORS 659.030 regulates. [FN150]
  Second, an employee wishing to challenge the facial validity of a law prohibiting "discrimination ," may assert that
the statute, as applied by his employer, is overbroad.  For example, an employee who wishes to place a "boudoir
photography" [FN151] of his wife or girlfriend on his desk at work, may be prevented from doing so by workplace
policy.  The courts, however, would not recognize a challenge to the employer's policy brought by the disgruntled
employee on free speech grounds.  Even assuming state action is present, [FN152] and that the policy is in
furtherance of the sexual harassment laws, ORS 659.030, while broad in its *747 scope, is limited to addressing
grievances brought by employees based on employer discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. [FN153]  The statute, while a limitation on some forms of speech, does not appear to be susceptible
to a facial challenge by a third party.  Such workplace policies would, presumably, be left to "freedom of contract."
  In summary, while ORS 659.030  may arguably be read to regulate speech on its face by prohibiting
"discrimination," the application of the prohibition requires focusing on the effects of offensive speech, not merely
speech in the abstract.  As such, a facial challenge to the statute as a regulation of "speech per se," while
conceivable, would probably be dismissed by the courts in light of the harm suffered by the plaintiff.  Where the
effects of the speech are the essential inquiry, the law cannot literally be called a "speech per se" statute.
2. Speech-Caused Harm
  The second kind of laws that have the potential of limiting freedoms of expression are those referred to as "speech-
caused harm" statutes. [FN154]  Such statutes focus on specific forbidden effects without explicitly prohibiting
expression. [FN155]  Whether sexual harassment laws may be included within this second category depends upon
whether the prohibition on discrimination in the workplace "expressly prohibits expression" in order to achieve the
statute's policy of eliminating sexual harassment in the workplace.  According to the argument that a prohibition on
discrimination (i.e., the harm caused by a discriminatory act) is tantamount to a prohibition on speech itself, it
follows that the statute's terms expressly prohibit expression.  Therefore, sexual harassment laws fall within the
second category and must be analyzed for overbreadth. [FN156]
  In analyzing an Article I, section 8 challenge to a statute that regulates harm caused by speech, the issue the courts
address is whether the challenged statute is overbroad. [FN157]  An overbreadth and narrowing analysis is a
constitutional inquiry that asks if constitutionally permissible activity is swept into the statute as written.  *748 If so,
the inquiry becomes whether a judicially imposed narrowing construction can remove most of the constitutionally
protected activity from the statute so as to leave its focus upon legitimately proscribed activity. [FN158]
  The present inquiry focuses on whether a prohibition on discrimination that may tend to encompass protected
speech is unconstitutionally overbroad.  It seems decisive to point out that if speech does not rise to the level of
"discrimination," it is not prohibited by the statute.  Any analysis under the statute itself leads to the inescapable
conclusion that the statutory prohibitions are sufficiently narrow as to avoid encompassing protected conduct.
"Protected conduct" in this instance encompasses all conduct that is not sufficiently severe as to create a hostile
environment. [FN159] Therefore, it seems implausible that a court would find ORS 659.030 on its face to be
overbroad, let alone attempt to construe the statute more narrowly than it already is.
  The question this Comment attempts to raise, if not answer, is whether the secondary effects of the sexual
harassment statutes lend credence to the argument that ORS 659.030 is overbroad in its effect.  Recall, for example,
the hypothetical employer who instituted a ban on gender-related jokes out of a fear of potential liability under
sexual harassment law.  Neither the sexual harassment laws nor court interpretations of the laws are so broad as to
place restrictions on all offensive speech, including gender-related jokes.  Courts have acknowledged that whatever
potential "harms" such jokes and related speech may cause are relatively minor and will generally not constitute
"severe or pervasive" conduct. [FN160] Nevertheless, the secondary effect of the statute may be to limit such
innocuous speech because of the potential for any harm that may be the basis for liability.
  In City of Portland v. Tidyman, [FN161] the Oregon Supreme Court dealt with the "secondary effects" argument in
the context of a city ordinance restricting the location of adult businesses.  At issue *749 was a city ordinance that
required adult businesses to locate at least 500 feet away from any residential zone or any public or private school.
The City attempted to justify its restriction on freedom of expression by finding that "adult bookstores and theaters
[are] inherently incompatible with residential zones 'because these businesses adversely affect the quality and
stability of nearby residential and commercial areas,' [and] that the 'clustering' of adult businesses 'tended to create
or accelerate blighted conditions . . . ."' [FN162] The court dispensed with the findings as "vague and conclusory,"
explaining that "[i]t is the operative text of the legislation, not prefatory findings, that people must obey and that
administrators and judges enforce." [FN163]  The court found that by omitting the supposed adverse effects as an
element in the regulatory standard, the Portland ordinance appeared to attempt to regulate the characteristics of
"adult" materials rather than secondary characteristics and anticipated effects of the store in violation of Article I,
section 8. [FN164]
  "[C]ases under Article I, section 8 , preclude using apprehension of unproven [secondary] effects as a cover for
suppression of undesired expression, because they require regulation to address the effects rather than the expression
as such." [FN165]  In contrast, the Portland ordinance at issue in Tidyman restricted the marketing of "adult"
materials, not only the effects of this marketing. [FN166]  "[W]hen the terms of such a restriction include the
specified harm from particular forms of expression, application of the ordinance necessarily requires showing the
reality of the threatening effect at the place and time . . . ." [FN167]
  In the context of the secondary effects under ORS 659.030, the goal of the law is not to reach speech per se in a
roundabout way as in Tidyman, but rather to effectuate the legislation's policy of reducing sexual harassment in the
workplace.  This goal is effectuated by employers creating anti-harassment workplace policies.  Such policies are
not "prefatory findings," but rather the basis for achieving the goals of reducing workplace harassment.
  As such, the secondary effects of anti-harassment policies *750 promulgated by private employers should be
viewed as effectuating the sexual harassment laws, and therefore subject to the same overbreadth analysis as the
legislation.  In that context, it is easy to imagine an employer's anti- harassment policy that potentially restricts
conduct protected by Article I, section 8. [FN168]  And, unlike a defendant's challenge to a "speech per se" statute, a
constitutional challenge to an employer's broad anti-harassment policy may in fact be cognizable in Oregon courts.
  This is so because of the nature of the Robertson analysis itself.  A speech per se statutory analysis looks to
whether speech in the abstract may be regulated.  And in the context of sexual harassment laws, speech itself is not
regulated, only the effects of such speech that create a hostile environment. [FN169]  In contrast, a speech-caused
harm statute prohibits a particular harm instead of the words themselves, but the effect of the prohibition is
susceptible to a challenge that the prohibition is unconstitutionally overbroad.  It is hard to tell exactly how this
differentiation would play out in practice, because employers' over-suppression of speech generally does not end up
in court.
  Nevertheless, it is plausible that such a restriction might be litigated.  Return to the example of the employer who
chooses to prohibit gender-related jokes.  An employee who feels his free expression interests have been
compromised may choose to take up the issue with his supervisor.  If the supervisor is intent on maintaining the
policy, the employee could challenge the rule as overbroad under the Robertson analysis without a required showing
that the law itself is facially invalid.
  In such a case, the courts will attempt to construe the statute narrowly to bring the scope of its restrictions within
constitutional boundaries.  If the law cannot be sufficiently narrowed, it violates Article I, section 8. [FN170]  In the
case of an employee who challenges an employment policy as overbroad, the "overbreadth and narrowing" analysis
would dictate a predictable outcome.  A court would presumably construe ORS 659.030 as restricting speech that
causes a hostile environment and, in the process, strike down an employment policy that had the effect of
unconstitutionally restricting protected activity. [FN171]
  *751 In the end, it is safe to say that ORS 659.030 is not, on its face, unconstitutionally overbroad.  Any specific
occurrence of restriction on protected speech through a workplace sexual anti-harassment policy could be rectified
by narrowing the scope of conduct an employer may legitimately prohibit.  The concern that remains rests on the
presumption that few employees, if any, would choose to challenge an employment policy in this fashion. [FN172]
3. Harm Per Se
  A law addresses harm per se when it focuses on forbidden effects without referring to expression at all. [FN173]
ORS 659.030 prohibits discrimination, but does not define how broadly "discrimination" is to be interpreted.  As
noted before, courts have interpreted the term "discrimination" to include speech-caused harms. [FN174]  Even if
one denies prohibition on discrimination is equivalent to prohibition on expression, sexual harassment laws still fall
within this third category.  A reference to expression is not required in the law, only a focus on the forbidden effect--
sexual harassment in the workplace.  Therefore, such laws may be analyzed "as applied" to the particular speech at
issue, similar to the analysis under speech-caused harm statutes. [FN175]
Conclusion
  Sexual harassment laws as applied by individual employers raise the issue of what free speech rights an employee
retains in the work environment. The laws themselves do not appear to prohibit any speech more than necessary to
achieve their stated purpose of ensuring a hostile free environment.  Under the constitutional analysis set out by
State v. Robertson, the laws appear to validly constrain individual expression because the laws are based on a
determination that the conduct complained of had the effect of seriously altering the victim's conditions of
employment.
  Rather than attempting to balance competing rights, the Oregon Constitution examines a law on its face to
determine the validity *752 of the constraints.  In the context of workplace sexual harassment, such restraints appear
not only valid, but a necessary condition of employment.  The laws operate to provide a level playing field for all
employees and ensure a workplace free of bigotry and oppression.
  However, when employers implement specific prohibitions on workplace conduct, concerns are raised regarding
the effect of such policies on constitutionally protected speech.  While some employers will initiate employment
policies to effectuate the policies of the sexual harassment laws, others do so merely out of fear of liability.  At least
one drawback to such a system is the authority employers are given to establish their own oppressive rules.  Many of
these workplace rules may include strict regulations on speech and expression - not for the benefit of diversity and
happiness in the workplace, but rather out of an acknowledgment of the liability associated with not doing so.
  This Comment has focused on the inherent tension between the employees' rights to not be burdened by strict anti-
harassment policies and the employers' attempts to live up to the duties placed on them by recent Supreme Court
decisions.  Of course, the victim should not be forgotten in all of this.  But, as this Comment attempts to identify,
valid restrictions on harassing conduct do not need to be sacrificed to ensure that employers treat their employees
with due respect.  Continued efforts by the courts to define what conduct is or is not actionable as a form of hostile
environment sexual harassment will effectuate the free speech rights of employees.  The Supreme Court's decision
in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul [FN176] started down this line, pronouncing the general rule that proscribable classes
of content-based speech may be regulated by statute. [FN177]  A line of Supreme Court sexual harassment cases
culminating in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth [FN178] and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton [FN179] provide some
guidance to employers regarding how to ascertain whether specific conduct fell within a "proscribable class of
content-based speech," and the necessary care an employer should exercise in addressing claims of sexual
harassment.  However, until a less amorphous statutory test for actionable conduct is articulated by the courts or
legislatures, *753 employee constitutional rights to speak on any given matter are seemingly exercised at the whim
of the employer.
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